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BOOK REVIEW
HUGOGROTIUS AND THE CENTURYOF REVOLUTION, 1613-1718: TRANSNATIONAL
RECEPTION IN ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, by Marco Barducci, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2017, 240 pp., £60.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-19-875458-9
The Internationalists: How a radical plan to outlaw war remade the world, by
Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, New York, Simon & Schuster, and London,
Allen Lane, 2017, 608 pp., $30.00/£30.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-1-5011-0986-7
The Dutch thinker Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a towering ﬁgure in seventeenth-century
intellectual life, as anyone whose work touches at all on seventeenth-century law, theology,
humanism, political thought, or neo-Latin poetry is surely aware. According to the seven-
teenth-century English divine John Owen, Hugo Grotius was a “a Gyant in all kinds of
Literature”. In England alone, Grotius was seen variously as a republican, a resistance
theorist, an absolutist, a Socinian, an Arminian, a crypto-Catholic, a de facto High-
Church Anglican, an apologist for the VOC, a learned poet, an irenicist, an Erastian, and
many other things besides. But because Grotius’ works spanned so many topics and genres –
and had wide ramiﬁcations across time and space – detailed studies of his reception have
faced major hurdles. Each of the two books under review takes a diﬀerent strategy.
Law professors Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, in their remarkable book The
Internationalists, focus exclusively on his legal œuvre and its reception in the history of
international law. Marco Barducci, by contrast, focuses geographically, attending to more of
Grotius’ full œuvre, but limiting himself to Grotius’ English reception. Each of these
strategies has its merits of course, but Grotius – and the seventeenth century – appear
quite diﬀerently in each.
In The Internationalists, Grotius might be considered more a condition of possibility
than its main focus. If you think international aﬀairs are bad now, they seem to argue –
along with Steven Pinker, who blurbed the book – just look at Grotius and his world. The
people Hathaway and Shapiro care about most are twentieth-century ﬁgures, many asso-
ciated with the so-called Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, who laboured – and to a limited
degree succeeded – in outlawing international war through international bodies and treaties.
Their main historiographical contribution – quite stunning in its own right – is that the oft-
mocked Kellogg-Briand, frequently criticized for its Panglossian ambitions to outlaw war
entirely, has been far more successful than its critics have been capable of acknowledging.
With a few notable exceptions, war for the acquisition of new territory has virtually
disappeared since the Paris Peace pact took hold. Crucially, however, Hathaway and
Shapiro’s argument hinges on a particular picture of the world prior to 1928, for which
Grotius is made the leading theorist and given detailed attention not only for his seven-
teenth-century writings but for their transnational reception. In Hathaway and Shapiro’s
account, the Internationalists of their title – jurists and diplomats like Salmon Levinson,
James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, and Hersch Lauterpacht – prevailed in overturning the
fundamental order of the previous centuries, an order for which Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac
Pacis (1625) had served as the de facto constitution. Grotius was the paradigmatic “old
order” thinker. As they tell it, the key features of that order were that it permitted war as a
lawful means of resolving international disputes, it recognized conquest as a legitimate claim
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to title, it required non-belligerent states to remain neutral, and it ultimately oﬀered few
tools beyond warfare in international crises. It was only in the twentieth century, Hathaway
and Shapiro argue, that states learned they could eliminate the most obvious incentives for
war by criminalizing aggression, by declaring conquest illegitimate as a claim to territory, by
relaxing the doctrine of neutrality so that non-belligerent states could punish war-making
states with economic sanctions, and by rejecting coerced agreements (so-called gunboat
diplomacy).
Their Grotius is still brilliant, but he’s hardly the patron saint of international under-
standing long perpetuated in international legal scholarship. As in recent work by Martine
Julia van Ittersum and Peter Borschberg, whom they follow, he’s down from the heavens,
writing fundamentally as a brilliant “corporate lawyer” for the Dutch East Indies Company.
The main contributions of this “the great apologist of war” were to justify dubious VOC
activities and to “recast the mass killing of human beings as a justiﬁed moral and legal
procedure” (97). There’s much truth in this account, but considerable complexity about
Grotius and his world is ﬂattened out in the service of the book’s depiction of a single Old
World Order where “might [was] right”. For instance, Hathaway and Shapiro ﬁnd it
convenient to say that republican poet John Milton was among those inﬂuenced by
Grotius but, instructively, this is Milton of a certain stripe. They ascribe to Milton the
anonymous 1655Manifesto of the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth declaring reasons for
war again Spain, yet they do so relying (confusingly) on 1753 and 1845 editions and without
acknowledging that modern Miltonists have been more circumspect about this ascription. It
is of course easier to depict a coherent epoch when famous poets like Milton are shown
enmeshed in its logic, but one worries the drive toward a homogenized “Old World Order”
lends itself to some cherry picking.
For all the clarity of argument in The Internationalists, then, Marco Barducci’s Grotius
and the Century of Revolution 1613–1718: Transnational Reception in English Political
Thought is an important complement. Quoting nearly verbatim the subtitle of Henk
Nellen’s unparalleled biography of Grotius, Barducci sees Grotius’ career marked by a
“life-long search for unity and peace in state and church” (87). Where Hathaway and
Shapiro are somewhat obliged by their thesis to depict Grotius and his contemporaries as
monomaniacally focused on justifying war, Barducci valuably tries to untangle many of the
overlapping aspects of Grotius’ reputation. He organizes Grotius’ English reception thema-
tically, discussing in seven learned chapters ﬁrst “State, Resistance, Government”, then
“State, Church, and Religion”, and ﬁnally “Property and Empire”. In Part I, Barducci tackles
the conundrum of a Grotius claimed both by mid-century resistance theorists like Henry
Parker and Samuel Rutherford but also admired and cited by royalists and absolutists,
including Henry Hammond and Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon. Barducci views Grotius
as essentially “conservative”, advocating fundamentally a “contractarian asbolutism”, which
is to say, an absolutism premised on the notion that “people were free to dispose of
themselves, so they could transfer their sovereign rights in return for protection” (61, 68,
29). But if the appeal of this view to English royalists is obvious enough, what then of
Grotius among resistance theorists? Here, it is Grotius’ theory of sovereignty – in particular,
his willingness to consider sovereignty as fundamentally divisible – that oﬀered parliamen-
tarians the opportunity to describe sovereign parliamentary resistance as lawful public war
insofar as Parliament held, at a minimum, some of the marks of English sovereignty (as
determined by historical inquiry inspired by Grotius’ comparable work on the Dutch
republic).
One of the aspects that made it diﬃcult for radical English dissenters to adopt Grotius in
toto however was Grotius’ strong praise for English episcopacy. Grotius’ “search for unity
and peace” led the Arminian Grotius along a via media between radical Calvinism and
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counter-Reformation Catholicism (87). His main English translator, Clement Barksdale
(1609–87), was an Anglican theologian and royalist, as were many of his English admirers.
But Grotius also believed that “episcopacy and presbytery. . .could coexist” (120) which
made him acceptable to moderate Presbyterians like Richard Baxter, and Grotius’ De
Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra (1647) put forward a broadly Erastian line
that could be wielded against overreaching ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
It is in the book’s ﬁnal section, where Barducci turns to property and empire, that his
book overlaps most with The Internationalists. Barducci shows Grotius’ considerable inﬂu-
ence on English imperialism. He points out that Grotius was read carefully by members of
the Virginia Company, the East Indies Company and late seventeenth-century Whig
expansionists, especially John Locke. Barducci rejects the notion that Hobbes was particu-
larly inﬂuenced by Grotius, even though Hobbes was himself closely connected to several
imperialist schemes including the Virginia Company, but he sees (rightly) a strong Grotian
strain in arguments for English property in the New World. He also sees the inﬂuence of
Grotius’ theories of punishment in Locke’s defence of human slavery.
If Barducci’s rich book has a blind spot, it may be in its general disinclination to consider
Grotius’ literary reception. There’s nary a word about Grotius’ substantial editorial work, for
example his Pharsalia (1614), Latin editions of Stobeaus (1623) or Euripides’ Phoenician
Women (1630), or his 25,000 lines of original poetry, which were highly regarded in
England. Is this because literature is not “political thought”? Never mind that Laudians
helped publish the unauthorized 1639 London edition of Grotius’ Poemata or that Stobeaus’
anthology was one of the main classical sources of early Stoic materials. Didn’t poetry and
philology at least help build for Grotius an ethos that aided reception of his prose? It would
still be good to know more about how readers in England understood the relations among
Grotius’ diﬀerent genres. When Francis Goldsmith published his 1652 English translation of
Grotius’ drama Sophomaneas, his editorial apparatus was festooned with quotations from
Grotius’ prose. How common was it to read the poetry and prose in tandem? Barducci
reﬂects on the novelty of approaching reception of political thought transnationally, but
what would it mean to treat literary reception as transnational political thought as well?
Such quibbles aside, Barducci has done scholars a great service in attending to so many
strains of Grotius’ reception, and readers understandably smitten with The Internationalists
will do well to read it alongside Barducci’s book. Together, Hugo Grotius and the Century of
Revolution and The Internationalists add substantially to the conversation about Grotius’
reception and suggest exciting new directions for scholarship.
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